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A B S T R A C T
Despite the increasing scope for transactional approaches to corporate political activity (CPA) in
emerging markets and rising concerns about the use of relational approaches, foreign ﬁrms in emerging
economies appear to be reluctant to adopt transactional approaches to CPA. Using Resource Dependence
theory we argue that criticality of resources, product diversiﬁcation, integration with other foreign
subsidiaries, and business ties may explain why foreign ﬁrms adopt a transactional or a relational
approach to CPA. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 105 subsidiaries of foreign ﬁrms in India. We
ﬁnd that unrelated diversiﬁcation and close integration with other subsidiaries of their parent ﬁrm
makes subsidiaries more likely to adopt a transactional approach, whereas local resource criticality and
ties to local businesses makes subsidiaries less likely to use a transactional approach to CPA. Our ﬁndings
enhance our understanding of the factors that determine foreign ﬁrms’ choice of approaches to CPA in
emerging economies.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) operating in emerging
economies are likely to be exposed to greater, more complex
and less predictable inﬂuences of the political environment on
their operations when compared to MNEs operating in developed
economies, given the institutional voids characterising emerging
economies (Luo, 2001; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Peng,
Wang, & Jiang, 2008). Because of this, MNEs are faced with a
greater need to proactively engage and interact with a variety of
non-market actors such as regulatory agencies, politicians, non-
governmental institutions and other organisations in order to
inﬂuence policymaking (Gao, 2006; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000). This
interaction in order to inﬂuence government policy is commonly
referred to as ‘corporate political activity’ (CPA) (Getz, 2001;
Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Schuler, 1996). Such CPA is geared not only
towards reducing the negative impact of uncertain environments
on the ﬁrm, but also to inﬂuence and shape government policy
in a way that is conducive to the ﬁrm’s business objectives,* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 0 1273 872798.
E-mail addresses: v.shirodkar@sussex.ac.uk (V. Shirodkar), a.t.mohr@kent.ac.uk
(A.T. Mohr).
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0969-5931/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.e.g. providing exclusive licenses, and obtaining inﬂuence rents
(Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011).
A central decision for ﬁrms to take in this context is about the
general approach to CPA (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim, &
Schuler, 2004). On the one hand, ﬁrms may choose to interact with
government policymakers or regulatory agencies only when
speciﬁc issues arise. This one-off issue-based approach to CPA is
referred to as a transactional approach (Hillman & Hitt, 1999).
Firms following a transactional approach engage only in a short-
term exchange with policymakers when particular issues arise, for
example, when faced with the prospect of new regulation that is
detrimental to their operations. On the other hand, ﬁrms may
interact with government ofﬁcials on a regular basis by developing
personal relationships with policymakers over time, so that when
issues arise, the contacts necessary to affect these issues are
already in place. This alternative approach to CPA has been referred
to as relational approach (Hillman & Hitt, 1999)
The distinction between transactional and relational approaches
has been used in a large number of studies on CPA (e.g. Hillman,
2003; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kozhikode & Li,
2012; Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright,
2012). The choice between the two approaches to CPA is important
because it affects the subsequent decisions of ﬁrms; such as
adoption of CPA individually or as part of a collective; and choice of
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constituency building strategy (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al.,
2004). The choice of approach is thus an important decision in
shaping the overall political behaviour of ﬁrms. As various studies
have shown, the choice of CPA approach also inﬂuences ﬁrm
performance (Niessen & Ruenzi, 2010; Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011). The
distinction between transactional and relational CPA in the context
of emerging economies has also been supported in Luo’s (2001,
2006) studies on business-government relations in China. Luo (2001,
2006) found that while some MNEs interact with the government in
an arms-length transaction-type fashion, others use long-term
cooperative approaches. Although previous empirical research
(Hillman, 2003; Hillman & Wan, 2005) has assumed that either
the transactional or the relational approach will dominate a ﬁrm’s
CPA it is important to account for the possibility that, as ﬁrms change
their CPA approach over time, both approaches may be equally
important at certain points in time1.
Despite the existence of both transactional and relational
approach to CPA, studies have emphasised that unlike in developed
countries, foreign ﬁrms’ CPAs in emerging economies are
predominantly based on the relational approach. While in
developed countries, ofﬁcial mechanisms, such as, for instance,
political action committees (in the U.S.) provide corporations with
legitimate ways to support particular politicians and parties during
election cycles in a transactional fashion (Grier, Munger, & Roberts,
1994), the absence of such legitimate mechanisms for business-
government interaction have caused the relational approach to
become the dominant means for ﬁrms to inﬂuence policy-making
in emerging economies (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011). In addition to
the lack of such ofﬁcial and legitimate mechanisms, scholars have
also emphasised upon the comparatively greater dependency of
foreign ﬁrms in emerging economies on local resources such as
local knowledge, networks and reputation (Luo, 2001; Meyer et al.,
2009; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). Research has,
for instance, investigated the role of creating and managing ties to
political decision-makers (Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2008a; Li, Zhou, &
Shao, 2008b; Sheng et al., 2011) or the creation and exploitation of
family or other social networks (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012). Yet,
we suggest that developments in the institutions in many
emerging economies over the past decade, including improved
business-government information exchange mechanisms provide
ﬁrms with greater scope to use transactional, rather than the
traditionally dominant relational approach to CPA. While there is
still heterogeneity in this regard across emerging economies,
emerging economies share a common trend towards better
institutions (e.g. Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Luo, 2001; Peng &
Luo, 2000). Scholars have therefore begun to examine wider
typologies of political strategies, such as those provided by Hillman
and Hitt (1999), to analyse the CPA of foreign ﬁrms operating in
emerging economies (Holtbru¨gge, Berg, & Puck, 2007; Puck,
Rogers, & Mohr, 2013). We suggest that India is a good example
of the institutional changes that have taken place in emerging
economies and thus provides a good setting for investigating
foreign ﬁrms’ CPA approach. For instance, business associations
such as the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry and institutions such as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
have become platforms on which businesses and the government
can discuss speciﬁc issues in a transactional fashion, rather than
developing on-going relationships with such regulators (Kozhi-
kode & Li, 2012).
In addition to the opportunity provided by the development of
institutions, recent research has highlighted that the use of a1 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this
possibility. We account for both of these possibilities through alternative measures
of ﬁrms’ CPA approach.relational approach to CPA can pose a risk to ﬁrms’ reputation
(Wright et al., 2005). In several recent instances, favourable
outcomes of using the relational approach in emerging economies
have found to have been reversed. For instance in Indonesia,
connections to the Suharto regime established through the
adoption of a relational approach became a liability for ﬁrms in
the post-Suharto era (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012; Fisman, 2001).
Similarly, studies in China have shown that the value accrued from
political connections developed by foreign ﬁrms through the use of
a relational approach may not always be positive in the long term
(Li et al., 2008a,b). In general, the exploitation of family and
political connections associated with the use of the relational
approach in emerging economies has also thus often been
associated with improper behaviour, such as, corruption (Lawton,
McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013). We thus suggest that there are strong
incentives for foreign ﬁrms to adopt a transactional approach to
CPA in emerging economies.
Yet, despite these possible downsides associated with the
relational approach, recent research shows that the relational
approach to CPA remains important for foreign ﬁrms operating in
emerging economies (Dong, Li, & Tse, 2013). For example, Sun et al.
(2012) have highlighted the importance of guanxi networks in
China, and Sawant (2012) has underlined the importance of
building long-term relationships with government ofﬁcials in
India. In this study, we aim to resolve this paradox by investigating
the factors that affect the likelihood of ﬁrms using a transactional
instead of a relational approach to their CPA in emerging
economies. Explaining the choice between these two approaches
remains of great importance to investors as well as policy-makers
in emerging economies due to the dynamic nature of the political
environment and because of the effect of ﬁrms’ choice of approach
to CPA on their performance (e.g. Luo, 2001; Niessen & Ruenzi,
2010; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). We do so by drawing on resource
dependence theory to highlight the effects of resource criticality,
product diversiﬁcation, inter-subsidiary integration and business
ties on ﬁrms’ choice of CPA approach.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the next
section we provide a brief review of the various theoretical
frameworks that have been used to explain ﬁrms’ choice of CPA
approach and argue for the particular suitability of resource
dependence theory in our study. We then build on resource
dependence theory to develop our hypotheses on the effects of
resource criticality, diversiﬁcation, inter-subsidiary integration
and business ties on foreign ﬁrms’ choice of CPA approach. The
subsequent sections explain the research context, empirical basis
and measures used in our study before presenting the ﬁndings. We
then discuss our ﬁndings and conclude the paper by highlighting
the paper’s contributions to research and practice and indicating
some worthwhile areas for future research.
Theoretical explanations of ﬁrms’ approaches to CPA
The majority of prior theory-based explanations of the
determinants of a ﬁrm’s choice of approach to CPA have been
grounded in the resource-based view, institutional theory and the
resource dependence theories. Studies using the resource-based
view (RBV) have emphasised on the potential effects of ﬁrm-level
factors, such as, for instance, ﬁnancial resources or experience on
ﬁrms’ choice of CPA approach. Scholars working on the basis of the
RBV have emphasised that good relationships with the govern-
ment provide ﬁrms with ‘political capital’ that can be a source of
competitive advantage, for example, by raising costs to rivals
(McWilliams, Fleet, & Cory, 2002) or reducing ﬁrms’ exposure to
risk (Puck et al., 2013). Yet, much of the empirical evidence in this
area comes from a domestic environment and various authors have
suggested that ﬁrms may be unable to leverage their resources and
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boundaries (Ozer & Alakent, 2013; Schuler et al., 2002).
Research drawing on institutional theory has highlighted the
need to account for the characteristics of the institutional
environment in different countries, for example, the level of
corporatism, when explaining ﬁrms’ choice of CPA approach in an
international context (Hillman, 2003; Hillman & Wan, 2005). In
emerging economies, ‘institutional voids’ associated with a general
inefﬁciency of legal enforcement, lack of government support to
some industries (Sheng et al., 2011) and levels of regulatory
complexity (Mondejar & Zhao, 2013) have been regarded as
important drivers of relational approach to CPA. In addition to
speciﬁc institutional characteristics, scholars have also suggested
that differences in the regulatory environments between ﬁrms’
home and host country are likely to affect decisions regarding the
extent to which foreign ﬁrms develop relationships with host-
government ofﬁcials and pursue a relational approach to CPA
(Mondejar & Zhao, 2013). Several scholars have suggested that
relational linkages to public institutions such as government
departments and regulatory agencies reduces foreign ﬁrms’
liabilities of foreignness and increases their legitimacy (Baum &
Oliver, 1991).
Finally, the resource dependence theory (RDT) has emerged as
one of the key theories to explain ﬁrms’ political activities in an
international context (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Meznar & Nigh,
1995; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008) and ﬁrms’ choice of CPA approach
in particular (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004). RDT
suggests that in order to survive organisations depend on access to
resources held by external actors and that the constraints
associated with this external dependence can be absorbed through
different mechanisms, including CPA. Scholars have suggested that
ﬁrms with greater dependence on government goodwill, access to
state-controlled resources, or supportive regulation are most likely
to be politically active (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Meznar & Nigh,
1995; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). In contrast, ﬁrms that are less
dependent on such resources are expected to be more reactive in
their CPA and to limit their activities to complying with existing
regulation and locally accepted standards to absorb external
constraints. Research has suggested that while the former group of
ﬁrms would thus be likely to employ a relational approach, the
latter group would be more likely to adopt a transactional
approach (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004). This relation
between dependence and choice of approach to CPA has also been
borne out by empirical studies (Grier et al., 1994; Sadrieh &
Annavarjula, 2005).
Due to its general assumption that organisations depend on
resources held by external actors (Kotter, 1979; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978), we suggest that RDT allows to account for both the ﬁrm-
level as well as the institution-level factors in as far as the effects of
both of these are ‘‘transmitted’’ to the organisation via the level of
its external dependence. In other words, both the characteristics of
a ﬁrm’s resources as well as the (foreign) institutional environment
in which it attempts to employ these resources will affect the
magnitude and nature of its external dependence and thus its
choice of CPA approach. We therefore suggest that RDT is
particularly suited to explain CPA approach chosen by ﬁrms in
their overseas markets.
Hypotheses
Resource dependence theory (RDT) provides a rationale for
studying the political behaviour of ﬁrms both within domestic and
international settings (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003). From a RDT perspective, different approaches to
CPA constitute distinct means to absorb the external constraints
associated with ﬁrms’ dependence on resources held by externalactors. Firms’ approach to CPA will thus depend on the contribu-
tion of different CPA approaches to absorb these constraints and on
the nature of resource dependence underlying these constraints.
Based on this logic we expect the contribution of different CPA
approaches to absorb ﬁrms’ external constraints and thus ﬁrms’
choice of CPA approach to be affected by the criticality of local
resources, the level of ﬁrm’s product diversiﬁcation, their
integration with other foreign subsidiaries and their local business
ties. We suggest that by using RDT to explain the effects of these
four factors on ﬁrms’ approaches to engage with political actors in
emerging economies, we contribute to explaining foreign ﬁrms’
preference for the relational approach to CPA in emerging
economies despite the increasing scope for the alternative,
transactional approach and despite the potentially negative effects
on their reputation.
Resource criticality and foreign ﬁrms’ approach to CPA
The criticality of resources is a key element of RDT that we
expect to play a central role in determining ﬁrms’ choice of
approach to CPA. A resource is highly critical if the ﬁrm’s survival
depends on access to the resource, i.e. there are no substitutes and
no alternative ways to procure the resource (e.g., Malatesta &
Smith, 2011). According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), if a resource
is critical for survival, uncertainty over continued access to the
resource will be more likely to be managed through use of power
gained through a continued interaction that fosters personal
relationships with political actors. The criticality of external
resources is thus an important determinant of ﬁrms’ choice of
approach to CPA. In particular, we suggest that the constraints
regarding access to critical resources can be better absorbed
through the adoption of a relational approach to CPA. This is due to
a number of reasons.
First, RDT emphasises that the government is one of the most
powerful actors in the external environment and is a major source
of both threat and opportunity to ﬁrms. Although not limited to
emerging economies, the government in emerging economies
tends to play a comparatively greater role in domestic economic
activity when compared to the governments in developed
countries. Institutional voids in combination with ﬂexible and
often shifting government intervention provide (foreign) ﬁrms
with room ‘create’ their environment through CPA (see, for
example, Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012; You & Du, 2012). Yet,
research on MNE-host government relations has stressed that
dependence on local resources reduces MNEs’ power vis-a`-vis the
host government and makes MNEs more likely to align their
strategies with the interests of host governments (Meznar & Nigh,
1995). At higher levels of external resource dependency foreign
ﬁrms in emerging economies will therefore be more likely to
absorb the constraints associated with uncertainty of access to
these resources by dealing with the government in a relational
fashion (Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010; Sun et al., 2012).
Second, foreign ﬁrms depend on access to new markets, skilled/
unskilled labour at low cost and natural resources that are
frequently controlled by the government and its regulatory
agencies in emerging economies (Meyer et al., 2009; Peng et al.,
2008). At the same time, foreign ﬁrms’ resources such as modern
technology and innovative management styles are also critical for
emerging economies to further their local economic and human
development. Such mutual dependence increases the scope of
interactions between MNEs’ subsidiaries and political actors
controlling important resources, resulting in greater cohesiveness
between the two parties (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Due to the
comparatively shorter timeframe and fewer resources involved in
the use of a transactional approach to CPA, this approach is less
likely to allow foreign ﬁrms and non-market actors (including the
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cooperate with each other in those areas, when compared to the
relational approach (Luo, 2001). In contrast, the relational
approach enables foreign ﬁrms to acquire detailed information
through on-going interactions and information exchanges over a
variety of issues. A transactional approach may thus be less suited
to absorb the external constraints associated with high levels of
resource dependence.
Third, a relational approach allows foreign ﬁrms to develop
relationships characterised by trust and reciprocity, which is
highly important when resources are critical and not available
from alternative sources of supply (Wicks, Berman, & Jones, 1999).
If foreign ﬁrms’ technological expertise is important to an
emerging economy and the emerging economy’s resources are
important to the foreign ﬁrm, a high level of trust can allow both
parties to reduce uncertainty of long term access to these resources
and allow ﬁrms to gain advantage over its rivals. Such a high level
of trust cannot be developed if ﬁrms’ managers approach
government ofﬁcials only when issues arise, because such a
transaction driven approach would portray opportunistic behav-
iour, and reduce the level of trust between parties (Mayer, Davis, &
Schoorman, 1995). Rather, a relational approach enables foreign
ﬁrms’ managers to engage in complex tasks and cooperate without
explicit short-term interests (Wicks et al., 1999). A relational
approach to CPA thus allows foreign ﬁrms to deeply embed
themselves in social and relational exchanges with local non-
market actors, such as non-governmental organisations and
ofﬁcials in regulatory agencies and other government ofﬁces
(Sun et al., 2010) and to develop the level of trust required to
absorb the constraints associated with accessing locally held
resources2. Based on these arguments we formulate the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The likelihood of foreign ﬁrms adopting a transac-
tional approach to CPA (as compared to a relational approach) in
emerging economies decreases with the level to which local
resources are critical for their subsidiaries.
Product diversiﬁcation and foreign ﬁrms’ approach to CPA
According to RDT, ﬁrms may spread and thus dilute their
dependence on the resources held by actors in its environment
through product diversiﬁcation (Kotter, 1979; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). Prior research has suggested that product diversiﬁcation
affects ﬁrms’ choice of approach to CPA (Hillman & Hitt, 1999;
Hillman et al., 2004). We follow this logic and suggest that foreign
ﬁrms’ unrelated diversiﬁcation within a host country, in particular,
buffers a ﬁrm’s operations in the host country from the constraints
exercised over critical resources by other actors in the ﬁrm’s local
environment, and increases a ﬁrm’s incentive to use a transactional
approach to CPA for the following reasons.
Foreign ﬁrms specialised in producing or offering related
products or services within the host country depend on a more
conﬁned set of critical resources (Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997).
Although such specialisation allows foreign ﬁrms to beneﬁt from
economies of scale in emerging economies (e.g., Luo, 2006) we
expect these subsidiaries to rely to a greater extent on political
actors within the host country when compared to diversiﬁed2 For example, when the Indian government was promoting locally manufac-
tured low-cost and fuel efﬁcient cars in the 1980s, Suzuki realised that it was crucial
to build a trust-based relationship with the Indian government while sharing its
valuable knowledge with Indian suppliers of related components. In order to absorb
external constraints, Suzuki thus adopted a relational approach for more than six
years with the Indian government culminating in the establishment of a long-term
collaborative agreement with government-owned Maruti Udyog Limited (Nayak,
2005).subsidiaries. This is because the dependence on a narrow set of
resources required to produce similar products makes it easier for
political actors to control and restrict subsidiaries’ access to these
resources increasing their dependence on support from political
actors. Baum and Oliver (1991) argued that specialised ﬁrms often
have limited slack resources and are therefore more dependent on
institutional linkages and the resulting beneﬁts (protection,
subsidies etc.) for absorbing external constraints. At the same
time, the number of policy issues affecting such specialised (or less
diversiﬁed) ﬁrms will be lower, allowing these ﬁrms to focus their
CPA on the speciﬁc political actors who make decisions on relevant
policies. We thus suggest that foreign subsidiaries that are focused
on related products will have greater incentives and will be more
inclined to engage in deeper relational exchanges with speciﬁc
political actors and will thus be less likely use a transactional
approach to CPA3.
We suggest that compared to specialised subsidiaries,
subsidiaries with unrelated diversiﬁcation will be less interested
in developing specialised knowledge on particular policy issues
and thus less likely to develop on-going relationships with political
actors. This is because with greater unrelated product diversiﬁca-
tion, subsidiaries also diversify the resources and external actors
they depend on for producing and/or offering these products
(Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997). This will reduce subsidiaries’
vulnerabilities regarding uncertainty of access to speciﬁc resources
and therefore the need to develop on-going relationship with
political actors controlling the use of these resources (Baum &
Oliver, 1991). Although at a global level, certain business units
within a diversiﬁed ﬁrm may depend on speciﬁc resources more
critically than other units, we argue that subsidiaries whose
products and/or services are diversiﬁed within a single host
country will have to deal with a variety of external actors. Using a
relational approach under these conditions will increase the costs
and complexities associated with CPA (Bercovitz & Mitchell, 2007).
Therefore, we suggest that diversiﬁed foreign ﬁrms are more likely
to contact political actors only when particular issues arise, i.e.
adopt a transactional approach to CPA. Accordingly, we formulate
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The likelihood of foreign ﬁrms adopting a transac-
tional approach to CPA (as compared to the relational) in emerging
economies will increase with their level of unrelated product
diversiﬁcation within the host country.
Inter-subsidiary integration and foreign ﬁrms’ approach to CPA
Research has argued that MNEs’ CPA also depends on the way
in which MNEs manage their network of international operations
(Blumentritt & Nigh, 2002). From a RDT perspective, subsidiaries
might be able to reduce their dependence on local resources and/
or absorb the associated constraints by drawing on resources
held at other subsidiaries of its parent ﬁrm (O’Donnell, 2000).
Thus, foreign subsidiaries’ level of inter-subsidiary integration
should have an effect on foreign ﬁrms’ approach to CPA in
emerging economies. In particular, we suggest that a greater
degree of inter-subsidiary integration, deﬁned as the degree toFor instance, Coca-Cola is critically dependent on access to ground water in its
local environments and thus affected by any regulation that restricts the water use
by MNEs (Taylor, 2000). Such a case occurred in 2004 when local ofﬁcials required
the closure of one of Coca-Cola’s bottling plants because it would reduce the
quantity of water available to local farmers. Although the High Court of Kerala state
overturned the decision of local ofﬁcials (Hills & Welford, 2005), in due course,
Coca-Cola seems to have adopted a relational approach to CPA in India, reﬂected in
its establishment of the ‘Coca-Cola India Foundation’ in 2006 that employs ex-
regulatory ofﬁcials in advisory positions (Coca-Cola, 2012) in order to manage on-
going issues over its access to ground-water in India.
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by other subsidiaries or its headquarters based in a different
country (O’Donnell, 2000) reduces both the dependence on local
resources and the need to absorb external constraints, thus
giving more room for a transactional approach to CPA. This is due
to a number of reasons.
In general, organisational research anchored in RDT has
suggested that uncertainty over access to critical resources is
reduced when there are alternative sources of supply that can
provide the resources necessary to an organisation’s survival
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Malatesta & Smith, 2011). Greater
inter-subsidiary integration allows ﬁrms’ subsidiaries based in
different countries to exchange critical resources that are
constrained by speciﬁc regulation in one country. Yet higher
levels of integration also lead to a greater need for integrating CPA
across the MNE’s network to avoid adverse effects of local issues on
the MNE as a whole (Hillman & Wan, 2005). In this situation the
transactional approach to CPA has been argued to be more suitable
because it allows greater ﬂexibility to deal with issues as and when
they manifest across the MNE’s network (Hillman & Wan, 2005).
Firms with greater international subsidiary integration are thus
more likely to contact policymakers as issues arise, i.e. they chose a
transactional approach, rather than a relational approach in each
individual country they operate in4.
Furthermore, subsidiaries that are integrated more closely
within the MNE’s network of international operations are more
likely to be characterised by greater ethnocentricity of organisa-
tional values and norms (O’Donnell, 2000). External control
mechanisms involving on-going and deeper relationships with
political actors are likely to affect the identity of the ﬁrm (as a
whole) and are therefore undesirable at higher levels of
international subsidiary integration. In emerging economies, ties
with political actors are often associated with unethical activities
such as bribing, hiring unqualiﬁed professionals onto certain
management positions (Li et al., 2008b), and exploiting family
connections (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012). Using a relational
approach to CPA may thus have adverse effects on foreign ﬁrms’
values and norms, and is therefore less desirable in situations of
high global integration of MNE activities. Given this risk that a
subsidiary’s on-going relationship building activities with political
actors in one country may affect the operations of other
subsidiaries and cause harm to the ﬁrm’s overall values and
reputation, it is more likely that internationally interdependent
foreign subsidiaries in emerging economies will interact with
political actors only when particular issues arise. Accordingly, we
formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The likelihood of foreign ﬁrms adopting a transac-
tional approach to CPA (as compared to the relational) in emerging
economies will increase with the level of inter-subsidiary integra-
tion.
Business ties and foreign ﬁrms’ approach to CPA
A particularly important mechanism to manage external
dependence in emerging economies has been the establishment
of informal managerial linkages across organisations (Li et al.,
2008a,b; Sheng et al., 2011; You & Du, 2012). Foreign ﬁrms’ ties4 For instance, despite government incentives favouring foreign automobile
companies to manufacture locally in India, Toyota heavily relies on its integrated
supply networks in countries across Asia. This has enabled the ﬁrm to contain the
negative impact of product recalls on its survival in India (Economic-Times, 2011).
While Toyota still contacted relevant ofﬁcials in India, these contacts were not part
of an on-going relationship that Toyota had created with the Indian government,
reﬂecting a transactional approach to CPA.with local businesses in emerging markets are important not only
to overcome the ‘institutional void’ (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha,
2005), but also to gather product or service related information
that may not be available reliably in the open market (Sheng et al.,
2011). We suggest that the existence of strong ties to local
businesses will affect a ﬁrms’ level of dependence on the
government and thus also foreign ﬁrms’ choice of approach to
CPA. Based on RDT in general, one could expect that that the
dependence on critical resources available from the environment
can be reduced by business ties (Kotter, 1979) leading to a
reduction in the need to interact with the government on a regular
basis, thus making a transactional approach more likely. Yet, in
contrast to this logic, we suggest that in the particular context of
emerging economies, foreign ﬁrms’ business ties make them more
likely to adopt a relational approach with regard to their
interaction with political decision-makers.
First, we suggest that in an emerging economy context,
business ties are imperfect substitutes for ties to political
decision-makers given the comparatively greater role played by
the government and regulatory agencies in these economies in
controlling access to (critical) resources. Notwithstanding the
potentially useful resources that ﬁrms might access through ties to
local businesses, the ultimate power over the allocation of many
important resources, such as, for example, licenses and permits,
ultimately rests with political decision-makers. Similarly, research
suggests that in emerging economies public policy is often decided
on by closed policy networks consisting of deep and recurrent
relationships between a small number of local private ﬁrms and
political decision makers (Rizopoulos & Sergakis, 2010). We
therefore suggest that unless business ties exist to these selected
few local ﬁrms, direct government contacts will be more conducive
for foreign ﬁrms’ attempts to manage their external dependence.
Second, several studies have highlighted the role of knowledge
associated with developing effective business networks as a key
resource to the ﬁrm (Scarbrough, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998).
Based on the notion of path-dependence (Pierson, 2000), we
suggest that the experiential knowledge gained from managing
external dependence by socially integrating with other related
businesses will become an important part of the ﬁrms’ overall
absorptive capacity and will increase the likelihood that foreign
ﬁrms manage their external relationships with political actors in a
similar way, thus making them less likely to adopt a transactional
approach to CPA. Conversely, foreign ﬁrms that have few ties with
local businesses may lack the knowledge and/or conﬁdence in
establishing and managing on-going relationships with the
government. Such ﬁrms are therefore more likely to contact
political actors only when particular issues arise that may affect
their business adversely, i.e. such ﬁrms are more likely to adopt a
transactional approach to CPA. Based on this discussion, we
formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. The likelihood of foreign ﬁrms adopting a transac-
tional approach to CPA (as compared to the relational) in emerging
economies decreases with the extent of their ties to local busi-
nesses.
Methodology
Research context and sample
We chose India as the setting for our research because the
institutional developments that we have argued to increase the
scope for foreign ﬁrms to engage in transactional approaches have
progressed further in India when compared to other large
emerging economies such as China or Russia (Schwab, 2012).
Table 2











Transactional 57 3.83 1.67
Relational 48 2.5 4.5
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critical to foreign subsidiaries’ survival remain under government
control (WIR, 2012). India thus provides a very good setting to
investigate our hypotheses as we expect a high level of variability
with regard to both foreign ﬁrms’ use of transactional vs. relational
approaches to political activity as well as the factors that we
argued to affect foreign ﬁrms’ choice of approach to CPA.
Data was collected through a web-based questionnaire survey of
the top managers (CEOs, Managing Directors or Country Managers)
of foreign subsidiaries operating in India. We obtained the ‘‘India
MNC Directory 2011–12’’ from Amelia Publications which provided
contacts of such top managers of over 3000 ﬁrms. The directory
included contacts of both (1) partly or wholly foreign owned
companies in India, and (2) Indian ﬁrms that have overseas
operations. The foreign-owned companies were headquartered in
nine countries (USA, UK, Australia, Germany, Netherlands, Italy,
Malaysia, Sweden and Switzerland). We decided to exclude
subsidiaries in which the foreign partner held less than 25% of
the equity. Although this is higher than the commonly used 5%-level
used in extant research to classify foreign subsidiaries, we wanted to
exclude subsidiaries in which foreign partners were only ‘sleeping
partners’ and were thus unlikely to be interested in CPA (Delios &
Beamish, 2001). We also excluded subsidiaries with incomplete
contact details. This left us with a list of 1910 foreign ﬁrms, each of
which, in 2011 received a link to our web-based questionnaire via
email. A very large number (900) of emails could not be delivered
and ‘bounced’ indicating that only 1010 emails were successfully
delivered. After email and telephone follow-ups over a three-month
period, 120 responses were obtained. We excluded ﬁfteen responses
due to missing data, resulting in 105 usable responses (10.24%). This
is similar to the response rate reported in prior research on political
strategies (Keillor & Hult, 2004; Puck et al., 2013). Due to the
sensitivity of questions asked, surveys on ﬁrms’ political strategies
usually achieve low response rate. In addition, the survey was
carried out at a time when the Anna Hazare-led anti-corruption
movement had gained momentum in India (Sengupta, 2012), and
this may have further reduced ﬁrms’ willingness to provide
information on their political strategies. Table 1 shows the
distribution of the MNEs in our sample by home-country.
Measures
In order to measure ﬁrms’ approach to political activity as our
dependent variable we used four items (see appendix) suggested by
Hillman (2003) and Hillman and Wan (2005). These were
measured on ﬁve-point Likert-type scales. We used alternative
ways to measure ﬁrms’ choice of approach to CPA. For a ﬁrst
measure we followed the method suggested by Hillman (2003) and
Hillman and Wan (2005) and created a dummy variable reﬂecting
ﬁrms’ dominant approach to CPA. To do so, we calculated the
averages of the items relating to transactional and relational,Table 1
Home country representation of ﬁrms.








United Kingdom 8 7.62
United States of America 31 29.52
Unknown 13 12.38
Total sample 105 100respectively. This ﬁrst variable took the value 1 if the average of the
two items reﬂecting the ﬁrms’ use of a transactional approach was
higher than the average of the two items reﬂecting ﬁrms’ use of a
relational approach, and if this difference between averages was 2
or higher (Hillman, 2003; Hillman & Wan, 2005). This variable thus
reﬂects whether a ﬁrm predominantly uses either a transactional or
a relational approach (transactional = 1; relational = 0). All ﬁrms
clearly fell into one of the two categories. The following Table 2
shows the allocation of the 105 ﬁrms in our sample to the two
different approaches as well as the averages of transactional and
relational approaches of these ﬁrms, respectively.
Fifty-seven of the ﬁrms in our sample followed a transactional
approach to CPA, while forty-eight ﬁrms were following a relational
approach to CPA in India. Although Hillman’s (2003) and Hillman
and Wan’s (2005) way of classifying ﬁrms’ approach to CPA leads to a
dichotomous variable, ﬁrms that are classiﬁed as following a
transactional approach may (to a lower extent) also follow a
relational approach. Table 2 shows that even for ﬁrms with a
predominantly relational approach there was evidence for elements
of a transactional approach, and vice versa. The use of a dichotomous
variable may thus be somewhat crude as it does not account for a
potential simultaneous use of the two approaches to CPA5. We
therefore calculated two further measures of ﬁrms’ CPA that reﬂect
ﬁrms’ use of transactional and relational approach to CPA separately.
To do so, we carried out a conﬁrmatory factor analysis on the four
items suggested by Hillman (2003) and Hillman and Wan (2005). As
expected, this analysis showed that the four items fell into two
separate components reﬂecting transactional and relational ap-
proach, respectively. The factor analysis allowed us to use the factor
scores for the two different approaches as dependent variable.
Overall, we thus use three dependent variables to measure (1) ﬁrms’
dominant approach to CPA; (2) the extent to which a ﬁrm uses a
transactional approach (a = .61); and (3) the extent to which a ﬁrm
used a relational approach (a = .88).
To measure resource criticality as our ﬁrst independent variable
we asked survey participants to assess their ﬁrm’s dependence on
seven tangible and intangible resources in the local environment,
as suggested by Srivastava, Fahey, and Christensen (2001). We
used a ﬁve-point Likert-type scale (a = .79, see appendix for items)
and calculated the overall criticality by taking the average
dependence on the seven resources.
We measured foreign ﬁrms’ product diversiﬁcation within the host
country using secondary data obtained from the companies’
websites or annual reports (if the company was listed). In order to
measure product diversiﬁcation, the companies that responded to
the survey were divided into publicly listed and unlisted companies.
For the listed companies, we followed the approach used by
Sukpanich and Rugman (2007) and Tallman and Li (1996) and used
the number of products offered by the company in different product
groups. If the share of the respective product/service exceeded 5%
of total ﬁrm sales in India it was included in our count measure of
diversiﬁcation. For unlisted ﬁrms we counted the number of
products and services offered by the company in different segments
from secondary company databases and ﬁrms’ local websites5 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this
possibility and suggesting the use of an additional measure of ﬁrms’ approach to
CPA.
V. Shirodkar, A.T. Mohr / International Business Review 24 (2015) 567–579 573without applying the 5% threshold applied to listed ﬁrms, in line with
the approach used by Sadrieh and Annavarjula (2005).
To measure foreign ﬁrms’ inter-subsidiary integration, we used
the constructs suggested by O’Donnell (2000). We used four items
to measure the extent to which other foreign subsidiaries and
headquarters inﬂuence the outcomes of the subsidiary using a 5-
point Likert-type scale (a = .71, see appendix for items).
In order to measure foreign ﬁrms’ business ties we used items
suggested in previous studies by Sheng et al. (2011) and Peng and
Luo (2000). We asked respondents to assess their ﬁrm’s connections
with (1) supplier ﬁrms, (2) customer ﬁrms, (3) marketing based
collaborators, and (4) technological collaborators (a = .64, see
appendix). One item (ties with competitors) with low item-to-total
correlation was eliminated to improve overall internal consistency.
We suggest that this is a reliable measure given the numerous past
studies that have used this measure (Sheng et al., 2011).
We controlled for various factors that have been shown to affect
MNEs’ political strategy choice in host countries. These included
subsidiary size, measured by the number of employees (Hillman,
2003; Hillman & Wan, 2005); subsidiary age, measured by the
number of years the subsidiary has been operating in India
(Hillman, 2003; Hillman & Wan, 2005); industry type, measured by
asking survey participants about their industry sector, and then
coding into a dummy—manufacturing (0) and services (1); degree
of foreign ownership, measured by the percentage of assets owned
by foreign parent or partners in the Indian subsidiary (Xu, Pan, Wu,
& Yim, 2006). Given the importance that prior research has
attributed to institutional factors in affecting ﬁrms’ choice of
approach to CPA we control for two institutional-level factors.
First, research has argued that the level of corporatism in foreign
ﬁrms’ host countries affect their choice of CPA (Hillman, 2003;
Hillman & Wan, 2005). As we focus on one particular host country
in our study, this was not possible. Yet, based on the assumption
that ﬁrms’ home-country imprinting (Kogut, 1993; Kostova &
Zaheer, 1999) may affect ﬁrms’ choice of CPA overseas, we control
for the level of corporatism in ﬁrms’ home country. Second, we
control for the institutional distance between India and the foreign
ﬁrms’ home country. In line with past research, this was measured
using differences in the scores for government effectiveness,
political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of
corruption, obtained from World Bank’s Governance index
(Mondejar & Zhao, 2013). See Table 3 for the deﬁnitions of the
variables and the data sources we used to measure them.
To avoid a common method bias, we used several ex ante
measures during the design of our questionnaire (Chang, van
Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010). First, in addition to the data
collected through our survey, we obtained data from secondary
sources for one of our predictor variables and for several of our
control variables (see Table 2). Second, we adjusted the question-Table 3
Variable deﬁnitions and data sources.
Variable Deﬁnition 
Political approach Transactional: short-term or one-off exchange 
Relational: long-term or on-going exchange wi
Resource criticality Degree to which (a set of) resources are impor
Diversiﬁcation Count of products/services offered in a differen
Inter-subsidiary integration Degree to which activities/outcomes of the sub
headquarters
Business ties Degree to which informal managerial linkages 
Subsidiary size Number of Employees 
Subsidiary age Number of years of operation in India 
Industry type Manufacturing (0) vs. Services (1) 
Foreign ownership Percentage of the subsidiary owned by foreign
Corporatism (home country) Degree to which legislative power in the ﬁrm’s
Institutional distance Formal difference between World Bank Govern
stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and conaire items to use terms that were familiar to Indian managers in
order to minimise ambiguity. As suggested by Andrews (1984) we
also provided different scale endpoints for some variables, and also
used ‘don’t know’ and ‘prefer not to answer’ options for each item.
Third, during questionnaire administration, we assured the
respondents conﬁdentiality and anonymity, and highlighted that
there are no right and wrong answers. We also used two ex post
approaches to check for a potential common method bias. First, we
used Harman’s single factor test (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, & Lee,
2003) which did not indicate a common method bias. Second,
following Lindell and Whitney (2001), we also used the partial
correlation procedure using a marker variable (managerial
autonomy) that was not related to either resource dependence
or approaches to CPA and could be used to measure the extent of
common method bias. This variable was not signiﬁcantly
associated with any of our variables, and the theoretical relation-
ships among the variables of interest were not affected, supporting
the absence of a common method bias. We also checked for a
potential non-response bias by comparing the responses of early
respondents (ﬁrst 30 responses) and late respondents (last 30
responses), in line with past research that has used this test (e.g.
Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Keillor & Hult, 2004). We found that
there were no signiﬁcant differences between the responses of
early and late respondents, thus indicating that there was no bias.
Results
Table 4 provides the means, standard deviations (SD) and
correlations. Although there were some correlations among our
independent variables (see Table 4), these were very low and
multicollinearity was thus not considered to be an issue. The mean
and SD for the dependent variables shows that ﬁrms using both
transactional and relational approaches were equally represented.
Similarly, the means and SDs of predictor variables indicates good
representation of ﬁrms with both high and low levels of resource
criticality, diversiﬁcation, inter-subsidiary integration and busi-
ness ties.
For our dichotomous dependent variable (dominant approach),
we used logistic regression to test our hypotheses, in line with
Hillman (2003) and Hillman and Wan (2005). For our two
continuous dependent variables, i.e. transactional approach and
relational approach, we used linear multiple regression analyses to
test our hypotheses. Table 5 shows the regression results.
Model 1 shows the baseline model using the dominant approach
(transactional = 1, relational = 0) as dependent variable, and with
the control variables only. Among the control variables, only
industry type appears to have a statistically signiﬁcant and
negative effect on ﬁrms’ choice of approach to CPA (p < .05). In
Model 2 we add the predictor variables to the baseline model forData source
with government policymakers Survey
th government policymakers
tant for survival Survey
t industry Company websites
sidiary are inﬂuenced by other subsidiaries or Survey




 parent company Survey
 home country is centralised Siaroff (1999)
ance Indices on government effectiveness, political




Means SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Relational approach 3.0849 .969 1
Transactional approach 3.1653 .886 .396** 1
Dominant approach .577 .496 .478** .826** 1
Subsidiary size 1781.53 6467.05 .191 .216* .238* 1
Subsidiary age 18.48 19.85 .237* .071 .111 .167 1
Foreign ownership 73.41 39.09 .121 .172 .010 .036 .132 1
Industry type .61 .49 .095 .066 .148 .176 .050 .109 1
Home Country corporatism 2.56 1.44 .031 .190 .213* .087 .007 .124 .103 1
Institutional distance 1.59 .59 .071 .116 .067 .071 .025 .400** .115 .757** 1
Resource criticality 3.14 .87 .221* .249* .301** .018 .025 .114 .257** .182 .137 1
Product diversiﬁcation 10.11 7.23 .119 .178 .209* .027 .036 .200* .007 .072 .129 .044 1
Inter-subsidiary integration 3.13 .65 .038 .264* .231* .176 .046 .138 .112 .167 .208* .011 .161 1
Business ties 3.84 .58 .389** .261* .305** .204* .071 .027 .210* .077 .028 .172 .016 .033 1
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.





(transactional = 1; relational = 0)
Transactional approach Relational approach
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Independent variables
Resource criticality .910* .197+ .203*
Product diversiﬁcation .103* .011 .013
Inter-subsidiary integration .984* .309* .029
Business ties 1.642** .276 .499**
Control variables
Subsidiary size .000* .000 .000 .000 .000+ .000
Subsidiary age .008 .016 .001 .002 .010+ .009*
Industry type .233* 1.030* .039 .273 .150 .088
Foreign ownership .004 .006 .004 .003 .001 .000
Home-country corporatism .530 .519 .228* .191+ .154 .179+
Institutional distance .740 .816 .330 .342 .336 .374
Adjusted R-square .051 .123 .056 .161
2 log likelihood 101.627 72.98
Nagelkerke R square .244 .527
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
N = 105.
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signiﬁcant negative relationship (p < .05) between resource
criticality and transactional approach in line with our ﬁrst
hypothesis. Our second hypothesis which suggested a positive
association between product diversiﬁcation and ﬁrms’ adoption of
a transactional approach is also supported in this model. The
respective coefﬁcient in Model 2 is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant (p < .05). Hypothesis 3 suggested a positive association
between inter-subsidiary integration and ﬁrms’ adoption of a
transactional approach. Model 2 shows that there is signiﬁcant
positive association (p < .05) between these variables thus
empirical support for this hypothesis as well. Finally, our fourth
hypothesis suggested a negative relationship between business
ties and ﬁrms’ choice of transactional approach to CPA. This
hypothesis is also supported by a statistically signiﬁcant negative
relationship (p < .01) between business ties and relational
approach, supporting this hypothesis.
In models 3 to 6, we repeat the above process by taking the
individual approaches to CPA as dependent variables. A comparison
of the results of model 2 (with the dominant approach as dependent
variable) with the results of models 4 and 6 (with individual
approaches taken as dependent variables) shows consistent results
for Hypothesis 1, which is supported in all the 3 models. Althoughmodel 2 supports our Hypothesis 2 regarding the link between
product diversiﬁcation and CPA approach, both models 4 and 6 do
not support it. Thus Hypothesis 2 is only partly supported. Regarding
Hypothesis 3 on the link between inter-subsidiary integration and
CPA approach, the results of model 2 are consistent with the results
of model 4; and for Hypothesis 4 on the link between business ties
and CPA approach, the results of model 2 are consistent with the
results of model 6. Thus besides our Hypothesis 2, our comparative
results provide consistent support for all of the remaining three
hypotheses.
Since 13 out of our 105 survey respondents did not provide us
with their home country details, the information that we could
obtain from secondary sources for two of our variables—
institutional distance and home country corporatism was limited
to 92 cases. Since our sample size was small, and given that these
were control variables, we decided to use the mean values for the
missing cases, rather than dropping these cases in our original
models (1–6). However, running our models with 92 cases did not
affect our results in any signiﬁcant way (see Table 6, models 7–12).
We also tested for the possibility of reverse causality using the
technique suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) for an
augmented Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test (see Table 7).
Speciﬁcally, we generated the residuals from our regressions in
Table 6
Regression results with N = 92.
Dominant approach
(transactional = 1; relational = 0)
Transactional approach Relational approach
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Independent variables
Resource criticality .737* .188+ .244*
Product diversiﬁcation .097* .011 .011
Inter-subsidiary integration .908* .299* .022
Business ties 1.550** .277 .460*
Control variables
Subsidiary size .000* .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Subsidiary age .003 .010 .002 .002 .011* .010*
Industry type .284 .911 .064 .306 .150 .120
Foreign ownership .004 .004 .003 .002 .002 .000
Home-country corporatism .526+ .468 .182+ .135 .160 .204*
Institutional distance .470 .302 .220 .186 .449 .552+
Adjusted R-square .036 .097 .059 .166
2 log likelihood 96.816 71.997
Nagelkerke R square .253 .507
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
N = 92.
Table 7
Reverse causality results—Augmented Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test.
Resource criticality Resource criticality Resource criticality
Logit residuals from model 2 .000 (p = .989)
Unstandardised residuals from model 4 .000 (p = 1.000)
Unstandardised residuals from model 6 .000 (p = 1.000)
Product diversiﬁcation .008 .009 .009
Inter-subsidiary integration .069 .047 .047
Business ties .109 .097 .097
Subsidiary size .000 .000 .000
Subsidiary age .001 .000 .000
Industry type .635** .690** .690**
Foreign ownership .004 .004 .004
Home-country corporatism .253* .252* .252*
Institutional distance .389 .469 .469
Adjusted R-square .074 .083 .083
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
N = 105.
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resource criticality and CPA approaches. We then tested the effects
of these residuals on resource criticality. If the effect of the
residuals had been signiﬁcant our models would not have been
consistent, i.e. suffered from reverse causality. The results of this
tests presented in Table 7 show that reverse causality was not an
issue in our models6.
Discussion
Our empirical results provide support for all of our hypotheses
regarding the role of various determinants of foreign ﬁrms’ choice
of approach to CPA. Our ﬁndings support the existence of a
negative association between resource criticality and foreign ﬁrms’
adoption of a transactional approach to CPA, as well as a positive
association between resource criticality and relational approach in
emerging economies thus supporting our Hypothesis 1. This shows
that foreign ﬁrms that critically depend on locally available
resources in emerging economies are less likely to use a
transactional approach and prefer to adopt a relational approach
to CPA. By including a variety of resources, this study enhances the
ﬁndings of previous studies which have already highlighted the6 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this issue.criticality of locally available resources on the political activities of
ﬁrms (Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that a relational
approach is a means to reduce the uncertainty of access to critical
resources that MNEs may be highly dependent on.
Second, we ﬁnd that the degree to which ﬁrms have diversiﬁed
their product range in a country plays an important role in foreign
ﬁrms’ choice of approach to CPA in this country. We argued that
foreign ﬁrms’ product diversiﬁcation within a host country reduces
its dependence on particular critical local resources, and thus
increases their likelihood of adopting a transactional approach to
CPA. Our empirical ﬁndings partially support our Hypothesis 2 on
the relationship between unrelated product diversiﬁcation and
MNEs choice of approach to CPA. The results of our analysis using
the dominant approach to CPA suggested by Hillman and Wan
(2005) are in line with our hypothesis, but also with past
suggestions on the effect of ﬁrms’ (overall, i.e. not host-country
speciﬁc) product diversiﬁcation on their choice of CPA approach
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999). They are also in line with Zhilong and
Xinming (2007), who found that in China, local ﬁrms reduced their
engagement in political ties (relational approach) through product
diversiﬁcation. However, once the two approaches to CPA are used
as separate dependent variables, product diversiﬁcation has no
signiﬁcant effect. One possible explanation for this lack of clear
support for this hypothesis may lie in the fact that rather than
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product diversiﬁcation may in fact increase their dependence on
local actors if the resources that they depend on for their
operations in multiple, unrelated industries are controlled by
the same or a small number of external actors7. The positive and
negative effects of unrelated ﬁrm diversiﬁcation on external
dependence and thus on the relative importance of a transactional
versus a relational approach to CPA may thus cancel each other out.
Third, we ﬁnd support for our Hypothesis 3 that inter-subsidiary
integration increases ﬁrms’ tendency to use a transactional
approach to CPA. We argued that inter-subsidiary integration
allows subsidiaries to draw on resources from other subsidiaries of
the ﬁrm and thus reduce its dependence on resources held in the
local environment. Given the resulting decrease in the subsidiary’s
need to manage access to local resources, we expected subsidiaries
to have little incentives to build strong relationships with the host
government through adopting a relational approach to CPA. High
levels of inter-subsidiary integration may also indicate a need for
the ﬁrm to coordinate political activities across its network of
operations. Developing strong and idiosyncratic relationships with
host country governments of different host countries, i.e. a
relational approach, is likely to be detrimental to such a
coordination of CPA across multiple countries. In the context of
highly integrated subsidiaries we also expected a transactional
approach to CPA to provide ﬁrms with the ﬂexibility needed to
align their host country political activities with their overall
organisational norms and values (O’Donnell, 2000).
Fourth, in Hypothesis 4 we expected that foreign ﬁrms with local
business ties are more likely to also use a relational approach to CPA,
rather than adopting a transactional approach. Existing research has
argued that ﬁrms operating in emerging economies use political ties
as well as business ties to improve their performance (Li et al.,
2008a,b; Luo, 2001; Sheng et al., 2011; You & Du, 2012). Due to
differences in the resources controlled by host governments and
local businesses, we suggested that business ties can only partly or
not at all substitute for the constraint absorption of political ties. As a
result, we did not expect the existence of business ties to lead to a
low-commitment, transactional approach to CPA. Instead, we
argued that due to path dependence and learning effects, business
and political ties may reinforce one another in the context of
emerging economies. The respective hypothesis was supported. Due
to a greater conﬂation between business and political networks in
emerging economies (Rizopoulos & Sergakis, 2010) we suggest that
ties with local businesses provide foreign ﬁrms with not only
relational skills required to build political ties (relational approach),
but also make them aware of the risks/opportunities associated with
on-going interactions with speciﬁc political actors that are of
concern to their business. Thus, by enriching RDT logic with the
notions of path dependence and learning we shed new light on the
role of business ties as a determinant of foreign ﬁrms’ CPA approach
in emerging economies.
From among our control variables, only the industry dummy is
statistically signiﬁcant indicating that ﬁrms operating in the
services sector are less likely to adopt a transactional approach.
This may be due to the generally greater level of regulation of
services sectors which requires ﬁrms to use a more long-term,
relational approach.
While research has suggested that ﬁrms need to deal with
institutional differences that could affect the extent to which
foreign ﬁrms may involve in government-relationship building
(Mondejar & Zhao, 2013), our ﬁndings on the effects of the
institutional distance between the foreign ﬁrms’ home countries
and host country indicate no signiﬁcant association between7 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing out this
possibility.institutional distance and foreign ﬁrms’ approach to CPA in India.
Our ﬁndings do not show an effect of the level of corporatism in
foreign ﬁrms’ home-country on their choice of CPA in host
countries either. Although this ﬁnding is not directly comparable
with prior research suggesting and ﬁnding support for an effect of
the level of corporatism in host countries (Hillman & Hitt, 1999) on
the CPA approach chosen by foreign ﬁrms (Hillman, 2003), it
indicates that home-country imprinting does not affect foreign
ﬁrms’ choice of CPA when operating overseas.
Conclusion
Our study was motivated by the question as to which factors make
foreign ﬁrms more or less likely to adopt a transactional approach to
CPA in emerging economies, rather than a relational approach that
most research on CPA in emerging economies has focused on. Using
RDT, we analysed the role of four factors that foreign ﬁrms’
dependence on local resources and thus their choice of approach to
CPA as a mechanism to ensure continued access to critical resources
that may be constrained by powerful actors in the political
environment. More speciﬁcally, we investigate how resource
criticality, product diversiﬁcation, international inter-subsidiary
integration and business ties affect foreign ﬁrms’ choice of approach
to CPA. In doing so, we contribute to the growing literature on ﬁrms’
choice of CPA by identifying the factors that prevent ﬁrms from
adopting a transactional approach to CPA in emerging countries
despite the drawbacks of a relational approach and institutional
changes that make a transactional approach more feasible.
Our analysis also contributes to the discussion of MNE-host
government relationships which has had a long tradition in
International Business (IB) research. Since Kobrin (1979, 1981)
highlighted the importance of political risk for MNEs, scholars have
continued to investigate the MNE-host government relationship
and focussed on issues, such as the distribution in bargaining
power between MNEs and host governments (Eden & Molot, 2002;
Fagre & Wells, 1982; Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 1991). The
management of the MNE-host government relationship has thus
emerged as a central topic in IB research. Recent research in this
area has provided differentiated analyses of ﬁrms’ overseas
political activities based on Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) ‘decision
tree’ model of CPA (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman & Wan, 2005).
We contribute to these on-going efforts to test the concepts
developed mainly in a US context in non-US contexts. Although we
focus only on the ﬁrst stage of Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) decision-
tree model, investigating the factors that inﬂuence the decisions of
foreign ﬁrms in emerging economies with regard to the second and
third stage of Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) decision-tree model was
beyond the scope of the current study, but would certainly be a
worthwhile extension. We also contribute to the on-going research
on the continuing use of informal ties with political actors in
emerging economies versus the use of more formal mechanisms
common in developed countries (Luo, 2001, 2006; Sun et al., 2012).
By using RDT as theoretical anchor we also respond to the call
for a better integration of the insights provided by this theory into
the literature on CPA (Hillman et al., 2009). We extend previous
research on political activities of ﬁrms anchored in RDT (e.g.
Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Although
several other theories, in particular, the institutional theory and
the resource based views have provided complementary explana-
tions of this choice, we suggest that with its focus on external
dependency, RDT allows us to discuss inﬂuences arising at the ﬁrm
as well as country level in as far as they affect this external
dependency and thus a ﬁrm’s choice of CPA. We also open up
further possibilities for the future development of RDT by
highlighting the notions of path dependence (Pierson, 2000) and
learning in the context of absorbing external constraints. These
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extensions of RDT, in particular with regard to the choice of
mechanisms to manage external constraints.
There are a number of limitations to this study which open new
alleys for further research on the topic of CPA in emerging
economies. A ﬁrst limitation relates to our measures. Although our
measures have been considered as valid measures by and used in
prior research, several of these measures could be improved. In
particular, the measure for approach to CPA suggested by Hillman
(2003) and Hillman and Wan (2005) views a ﬁrm’s ‘‘limited
political involvement’’ as an indicator for a transactional approach,
while this may also indicate a lack of any approach chosen by the
ﬁrm. We suggest there is a need for measures of CPA that do not
conﬂate ﬁrms’ decision on whether or not to engage in CPA with
their decision to adopt a particular approach to CPA. More reﬁned
measures of CPA should also be made comparable to measures of
business ties to allow for an analysis of the degree to which such
relationships are substitutive or complementary. Second, we
investigated the role of product diversiﬁcation in a particular
host-country in explaining foreign ﬁrms’ choice of approach to
CPA. Given that prior research has stressed the role of ﬁrms’ overall
product diversiﬁcation as well as their geographical diversiﬁcation
(Hillman, 2003), future research should investigate the effect that
such corporate level factors have on the choice of CPA approach in
one or more of the ﬁrm’s host countries. Third, our model did not
account for potential mediating or moderating effects. The
mechanisms that lead ﬁrms to adopt particular approaches to
CPA in emerging economies may be more complex. We suggest
that business ties may play a more complex role that may be a
worthwhile area for future research, such as it may moderate the
relationship between resource dependence and approaches to CPA.
Although we took various measures to avoid a common method
bias, future research developing and testing such complex models
would also reduce concerns regarding a common method bias
(Chang et al., 2010). Fourth, while we found no evidence for reverse
causality in our models, endogeneity may still be an issue in as far
as ﬁrms’ decision to accept critical dependence on certain local
resources in emerging economies may be related to their choice of,
or success with a particular approach to CPA. Future research may
look at reverse relationships8, such as whether ﬁrms’ political
actions (including approaches to CPA) can be used to create
‘favourable external environments’ (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Finally, the heterogeneity of the political environments across
emerging economies limits the generalizability of our ﬁndings
regarding the relationship between resource criticality and
transactional and relational CPA in emerging economies to political
environments that are comparable to India’s political environ-
ment. Future research that includes other emerging economies is
thus needed to clarify the applicability of our ﬁndings across a
wider range of emerging economies. Despite these limitations, we
suggest that our study enhances our understanding of the foreign
ﬁrms’ choice of approach to CPA and addresses the growing need
for understanding the intersection between research on ﬁrms’
international operations and their corporate political activities.
Appendix A. Measurement constructs
Political approach (Hillman, 2003; Hillman & Wan, 2005)
To what extent do you disagree/agree with the following
statements, with regard to dealing with government ofﬁcials for
issues affecting your organisation’s operations? (Issues for instance—
new tax regulations, subsidies, ownership policies, etc.) (1: Strongly
disagree, up to5: Strongly agree)8 We like to thank one the anonymous reviewers for pointing out this issue.1. We tend to wait until regulatory issues affecting our business
arise before developing plans and actions in an attempt to
inﬂuence these issues (transactional).
2. We have maintained good personal relationships with ofﬁcials
in various levels of government, so that when regulatory issues
arise that may affect our operations in this country, the contacts
are already in place to inﬂuence these issues (relational).
3. We have developed good connections with ofﬁcials in regulato-
ry and supporting organisations such as tax bureaus, state banks
and commercial administration bureaus (relational).
4. Relatively few public policy issues arise during any given year
that our subsidiary is interested in, so we tend to have limited
political involvement in this country (transactional).
Resource criticality (Srivastava et al., 2001) (a = .79)
‘The following questions are about the importance of various
resources available in India to your organisation’ How important are
the following resources for the day-to-day operations of your
business? (1: Not at all important, up to5: Very important)
1. Land (e.g. for construction or agri-businesses).
2. Up-to-date production machinery/equipment.
3. Unskilled workers (low cost, minimum wage labour).
4. Raw materials (natural resources).
5. Speciﬁcally owned patented technology/technological know-
how.
6. Highly Skilled employees (engineers, scientists, doctors, accoun-
tants, consultants, etc.).
7. Reputation of your company (e.g. product brand names or
company name).
Inter-subsidiary integration (O’Donnell, 2000) (a = .71)
To what extent do you disagree/agree with the following
statements (1: Strongly disagree, up to5: Strongly agree)
1. The activities of headquarters inﬂuence our outcomes.
2. Our activities inﬂuence the outcomes of headquarters.
3. The activities of other foreign subsidiaries inﬂuence our
outcomes.
4. Our activities inﬂuence the outcomes of other foreign subsidiaries.
Business ties (Sheng et al., 2011) (a = .64)
To what extent do you disagree/agree with the following
statement? (1: Strongly disagree, up to5: Strongly agree): ‘‘We have
built good connections with managers at —
1. Supplier ﬁrms in India.
2. Customer ﬁrms in India.
3. Marketing based collaborators in India (E.g. distributors,
advertisers etc.).
4. Technological collaborators in India (E.g. Information Systems/
Web service providers etc.).
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